This paper studies the degree to which gasoline price spikes in California, Illinois and Wisconsin over 1995 to 2001 can be explained by regulatory differentiation -gasoline sold in California, Illinois and Wisconsin is chemically different than gasoline sold in other locations as a result of local regulation supplementary to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. I specify a structural model based on the production optimization problem of refiners and estimate wholesale prices for jet fuel, diesel and four blends of gasoline in each geographic market. I then simulate a counterfactual in which gasoline in the three states meets federal requirements. Comparing the results from the counterfactual to the initial model, allows me to distinguish the degree to which prices spikes in these markets are the result of regulatory differentiation, rather than geographic heterogeneity. I estimate that 72, 92 and 91 percent of price spikes created by refinery fires in California, Illinois and Wisconsin could be mitigated by compatibility with federal RFG standards. Moreover, I also quantify the effect of two other factors thought to increase gasoline prices, (i) changes in refinery ownership and (ii) limited expansion of domestic refining capacity.
Introduction
Gasoline prices garner tremendous attention from regulators, legislators and consumers. One motivation for recent interest is that gasoline prices in different parts of the country often rise and fall substantially relative to one another. For example, the average retail price of gasoline in Chicago rose from $1.61 to $2.15 a gallon from May 1, 2000 to June 20, 2000 . By July 24, the gasoline price in Chicago had dropped to $1.49. 1 In contrast, the retail price in Houston, a city connected to Chicago by low-cost pipelines, rose from 1.48 to 1.59 and then fell to $1.57 over the same period.
This paper studies the degree to which similar price spikes in California, Illinois and Wisconsin over 1995 to 2001 can be explained by regulatory differentiation -gasoline sold in California, Illinois and Wisconsin is chemically different than gasoline sold in other locations as a result of local regulation. 2 This paper quantifies the price effect of local gasoline content regulations in these three states. In addition, I quantify the effect of two other structural changes in the refining industry concurrent with the introduction of content regulations: (1) changes in refinery ownership related to mergers and divestitures over the study period, and (2) increasing utilization of domestic refining capacity. Moreover, this paper distinguishes the effect of regulatory differentiation created by state-level gasoline content regulations from the effect of geographic differentiation arising from transportation costs. Identifying the relationship between each form of differentiation has policy implications beyond gasoline pricing. To the extent that two jurisdictions are geographically heterogeneous, inconsistent regulation across the two will have little incremental effect. If transportation or travel costs between the two jurisdictions are low, though, regulatory differentiation may have a substantial effect.
To quantify the effect of the regulations in California, Illinois and Wisconsin, I specify a structural model of the refining industry based on the production optimization problem faced by individual refineries, allowing for unobservable cost, conduct and elasticity parameters. I estimate unobservable the unobserable parameters of the model numerically. Using the point estimates, I then simulate prices of wholesale gasoline in Illinois, Wisconsin and California as if the states used gasoline compatible with federal standards. This approach controls for transportation costs, refinery capacity constraints, and changes in refinery ownership. Using a self-constructed data set of refinery fires, explosions and other unexpected outages, I identify months with and without unanticipated local supply shocks. Comparing simulated prices in months with and without local refinery outages, I separately identify persistent effects of these regulations, such as additional production costs, from the dynamic effects of these regulations, arising from constraints limiting the ability to move gasoline between geographic markets in response to shocks. I also simulate counterfactuals controlling for refinery consolidation and declining reserve refining capacity. These simulations estimate the effect of changes in refinery ownership and domestic capacity constraints on wholesale gasoline prices.
Section 2 discusses the relevant economic and policy literature. Section 3 provides a back-ground on content regulations and the refining industry, focusing in particular on why regulation of gasoline content and refinery outages effect wholesale gasoline prices and the relationship between the effects. Section 4 details the data used and section 5 presents a model of gasoline refining and discusses estimation and fit of the model. In Section 6, I specify counterfactuals and simulate the effect of the content regulations on regional wholesale gasoline price volatility.
In addition, I also simulate alterative counterfactuals and test the robustness of the results to both modelling assumptions and the coefficients of the estimated structural parameters. Section 7 concludes.
Previous Literature
A number of academic papers, along with policy studies by the FTC, EPA, Senate Subcommittee on Investigations and state commissions, qualitatively analyze structural changes in regional gasoline markets contributing to large changes in regional gasoline prices. 3 In general, these studies identify three structural changes in the gasoline markets that increase the frequency and magnitude of regional price spikes: (1) inconsistent gasoline content regulations across different geographic regions, (2) increasing domestic refinery utilization rates, and (3) industry consolidation within the oil industry. Focusing on specific incidents, previous qualitative studies identify incident-specific factors, including refinery outages, transportation constraints, reductions in product inventories, or transition costs associated with meeting new environmental regulations.
A few papers estimate wholesale and retail price effects of gasoline content regulations. These papers exploit cross-state or inter-temporal variation in regulation to estimate the effect of regulations on gasoline prices. Using a similar approach to previous research of other state-level regulatory policies, including divorcement regulation (Vita, 2000) , self-service bans (Vande- employing a differences-in-differences approach. Despite differences in their methodologies, the studies find content regulations are associated with an increase in wholesale and retail gasoline prices of 3-6 cents per gallon.
This paper departs from the reduced-form approach used in previous studies in favor of a structural approach similar to that used in Considine and Heo (2002) . Considine and Heo specifies a structural models based on the production optimization problem facing refineries, determining production of not only gasoline, but also jet fuel, distillate and other petroleum products. Unlike these papers, which aggregate individual refiner behavior up to national prices and inventories, this paper optimizes the production decisions for individual refineries choosing quantities of products at the state-product level. I model the production choice of individual refineries incorporating refinery supply adjustment costs associated with rapid changes in refinery production identified in Borenstein and Shepard (2000) . Explicitly modelling the production decisions of refiners allows me to control for factors that affect regional price levels and volatility, but are difficult to incorporate in a reduced-form approach, including refinery production constraints, changes in refinery ownership, transportation costs and substitutability of different refined products.
This paper identifies the extent to which regulatory heterogeneity and geographic differentiation separately contribute to differentiating the wholesale gasoline markets of California, Illinois Brett use a semiparametric model to identify the geographic limits of domestic wholesale gasoline markets. While their approach does not rely on industry-specific structural assumptions, the structure I impose on my model allows for the simulation of several counterfactuals.
3 Industry Overview
Petroleum Basics
The petroleum industry is vertically organized into six steps: (i) Crude extraction and transportation to refineries (ii) refining of crude oil, (iii) Transportation of refined products by pipeline or barge to regional terminals, (iv) Storage and wholesale sale at regional terminals, (v) Transportation by truck to retail stations and (vi) Retail sale.
I focus on the production decision of refineries. Refineries heat crude oil and separates it into different parts or "streams" of intermediate products. The refiner then blends the streams together into end products such as gasoline, jet fuel and diesel. 4 Due to the relative price premium associated with gasoline, jet fuel and diesel, refiners maximize production of these light products subject to capacity constraints of refinery production units. Refiners trade off production between different light products in response to relative prices.
Refiners contract for crude oil several months in advance. The characteristics of the crude oil and the set of processing units at a particular refinery bound the set of end-products a particular refinery can produce. After the choice of crude oil is made, a refiner is constrained in the set of end products they can produce. Although a refiner is able to adjust the mix of refined products to a limited extent by changing the operation of the refinery, changes at this point are small relative to those made by refiners through the choice of crude oil. Thus, during a three to six week production run, when the choice of crude is effectively fixed, refiners have limited flexiblity in the set of products they produce, while over time they have considerably more flexiblity.
5
Domestic refineries produce the vast majority of domestically-consumed light products, accounting for approximately ninety percent of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel consumption in 2001.
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Over fifty percent of domestic refining capacity is located in Texas, Louisiana and California.
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Remaining domestic refining capacity is sited near specific end markets (e.g. New York City, Philadelphia or Chicago) or other sources of crude oil (e.g. Wyoming). To meet regional demand, the East Coast, upper Midwest and occasionally West Coast import gasoline from Gulf Coast refineries. To supply these non-local markets, refiners in the Gulf ship petroleum products by barge or pipeline to regional wholesale terminals located near most metropolitan areas. Wholesale terminals serve as a point of sale for industrial and wholesale customers. Terminals also carry limited inventories, typically storing sufficient gasoline and other refined products to serve 2 weeks of local demand. From the terminal, gasoline is sold to retail stations either at the Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price or the Rack price, depending on whether or not the terminal operator provides truck transportation from the terminal to the retail station. Since transportation by truck is substantially more expensive than transportation by barge or pipeline, products, such as fuel oil and coke. 5 See Borenstein and Shepard (2001) and Muehlegger (2002) for discussions of supply adjustment costs in crude oil refining. 6 Although international imports vary significantly by region, even in the area with the greatest product imports, the East Coast, imports accounted for 22, 21 and 23 percent of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel consumption. 7 As of January 1, 2002, total domestic atmospheric distillation capacity was 17.6 million barrels per day -25, 16 and 12 percent of this capacity was located in Texas, Louisiana and California respectively. Distillation is the first step in the refining process, where the refinery heats and separates crude oil based on boiling point. 8 Gulf Coast refineries produced roughly 57 and 16 percent of wholesale gasoline consumed in PADD 1 (East Coast) and PADD 2 (Midwest), respectively, in 2001.
wholesale terminals are located near most metropolitan areas.
Aside from the introduction of gasoline content regulations, two structural changes in the petroleum industry affect refinery operation during the study period. Through mergers and divestitures, a number of large refineries changed ownership in the late 1990's.
9 Although refinery divestitures required by the FTC prevented large increases in concentration indices, local changes in ownership may change refinery competition and production. In addition, domestic refining capacity has increased at a lower rate than demand for refined products since the early 1980's. In 1981, annual refinery production was 68 percent of refinery capacity. 10 Due to closures of old refineries, increasing demand and limited capacity investment at existing sites over the past twenty years, current utilization of refining capacity exceeds 95 percent. Over the study period, refinery capacity constraints play a larger role over time.
Gasoline Content Regulations
In 1990, the the Clean Air Act Amendment mandated federal content criteria for gasoline in regions failing to meet EPA limits for ozone and carbon monoxide pollution. The amendment mandated three broad regional classes of gasoline: conventional, oxygenated and reformulated gasoline (RFG), designing oxygenated gasoline to reduce carbon emissions and RFG to limit ground-level ozone pollution.
11 Oxygenated gasoline contains a higher oxygen content than conventional gasoline reducing CO emissions in cold weather. Reformulated gasoline places limits on volatility, reducing the propensity of gasoline to evaporate and lowering ozone emissions.
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Subsequent to the federal regulation, many states chose to enact supplementary regulations, either by voluntarily adopting the federal requirements or by mandating more strict regulations. 12 Ground-level ozone increase with temperature, as evaporative emissions increase, and also increases as a function of sunlight. Hence, ozone emissions rise in summer, in warm climates. Alternatively, carbon emissions increase with incomplete combustion associated with starting a cold engine, and are more of a problem in cold climates during the winter. 13 Demand from regions opting-in to the federal RFG program accounts for approximately one-third of RFG demand. Although firms could opt to sell federal RFG in Chicago, they would forfeit tax benefits for MTBE-RFG, as well as for other gasoline mixed with the MTBE-RFG at the wholesale terminal. As a result, gasoline meeting federal RFG requirements is not sold in areas requiring CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG. It is also important to note that not only does federal RFG fail to meet the content specifications of these two blends of gasoline, but CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended RFG are mutually incompatible.
I focus specifically regulatory differentiation of CARB, ethanol-blended RFG and federal RFG. Unlike oxygenated gasoline, these blends require refinery-level production adjustments and thus are completely incompatible after leaving the refinery. RFG. 14 Oxygenated gasoline, on the other hand, may be met by increasing the oxygen content post-production.
Regional Price Volatility and Refinery Outages
The primary goal of this paper is to study the effect of regulatory differentiation of gasoline due to the introduction of supplementary state-level content regulations. In particular, this paper examines the extent to which content regulations in Illinois, Wisconsin and California contribute to gasoline price spikes resulting local supply shocks, in the form of fires, explosions and other unexpected outages at refineries.
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Regulatory differentiation of gasoline in California, Illinois and Wisconsin has three distinct price effects. First, CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended RFG are more costly to refine than conventional gasoline. Second, additional refining costs associated with state-specific content regulations might change the set of refiners who product a particular blend of gasoline. Finally, incompatible blends of gasoline constrain the response of refiners and marketers facing supply and demand shocks. The first two effects are persistent and would increase average gasoline 14 Oxygenated gasoline an be met by additives which increase the oxygen content, and do not necessitate a change at the refinery level. 15 Pipeline outages, which are not explicitly modelled in this paper, can act in a similar manner to supply shocks. prices. The third only affects prices in the event of an unexpected supply or demand shock.
Moreover, whether or not regulatory differentiation compounds the effect of supply and demand shocks is directly related to the degree of geographic differentiation across regions. For example, little gasoline meeting federal reformulated gasoline (RFG) standards is sold in the Midwest.
Even if gasoline in Illinois and Milwaukee were compatible with federal RFG, transportation costs from locations producing federal RFG might be sufficient to limit shipments from other RFG-producing areas in response to a local shock in the Chicago gasoline market. In this case, the transportation costs rather than the regulatory differentiation contribute to the price effect resulting from a unexpected shock. If, on the other hand, transportation costs to Illinois and Milwaukee from other markets using federal RFG are relatively low, regulatory differentiation may compound the effect of a refinery outage.
Data
I collect two sets of data: (i) market-level prices and quantities, and (ii) refinery-level data influencing production decisions, such as oil prices, transportation costs and refinery outages. 16 Prices are average monthly "rack" price net of taxes for each state-formulation combination. The "rack" price is the wholesale price paid at the terminal and does not include any transportation costs from the terminal to the individual stations.
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For diesel and jet fuel, I use regional average monthly prices net of taxes of product sold for resale in each of eight petroleum area defense districts PADDs. 18 Volumes for all products are prime supplier volumes defined as sales by wholesale marketers to retailers. To verify that prime supplier volumes are representative of wholesale gasoline volumes, I compare the EIA 16 Ideally, the relevant market for wholesale gasoline would be at the terminal-formulation level. While state-level data does not bias the estimate of persistent effects of content regulation, it would lead to a conservative estimate of the effect of content regulation on price spikes if within-state transportation costs are sufficient to limit arbitrage between terminals within the same state. 17 A shortcoming of the EIA data is that it does not differentiate between branded rack sales (eg. sales of Chevron gasoline) and unbranded rack sales.
18 Roughly corresponding to the Northeast (1a), Mid-atlantic (1b), South-east (1c), Midwest (2), Gulf Coast (3), Rocky Mountains (4) and West Coast (5).
prime supplier gasoline volumes to state-reported monthly wholesale gasoline sales reported to the Federal Highway Administration.
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Although sales of CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended reformulated gasoline are not explicity identified in the EIA data, both gasoline blends meet federal-RFG standards and are reported as such in the dataset. Since, no other gasoline blends in California, Illinois and Wisconsin meet federal RFG standards, I attribute all reported RFG sales in these states as either a sale of CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG. I also aggregate conventional and oxygenated gasoline, since oxygenated gasoline is effectively undifferentiated from conventional gasoline at the refinery.
Thus, the structural model focuses on six light petroleum products, four of which are distinct blends of gasoline: (i) conventional gasoline, (ii) federal-mandate reformulated gasoline, (iii) ethanol-blended RFG, (iv) CARB gasoline, (v) jet fuel or kerosene, and (vi) diesel fuel or number two distillate fuel. My panel of market-level data consists of 6198 observations by month for sixty two state-formulations of gasoline, eight regional markets for jet fuel and eight regional markets for diesel fuel.
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To simulate refinery production, I construct several refinery-specific variables covering (i) ownership and capacity of refineries, (ii) crude oil and transportation costs, (iii) refinery outage information, and (iv) petroleum product imports. I construct a comprehensive dataset of refinery ownership, closures and capacity over the study period from the EIA Petroleum Supply Annual and annual surveys conducted by the EIA of petroleum capacity at domestic refineries. While the annual surveys include the capacity of various production units at refineries, they do not explicitly define production capacity of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel at these refineries. I use a function of distillation and cracking capacity to calculate the production limit of light products at these refineries, based on crude oil assays which specify the mix of light products derivable from West Texas Intermediate at a simple (distillation only) refinery. 21 Of the 173 domestic refineries operating at some point during the study period, I consider the subset of 117 refineries 19 Although FHA data only report wholesale gasoline sales aggregated across federal formulation standards, I similarly aggregated EIA data for purposes of comparison. Aside from several instances of reporting or recording error in the FHA data, same-state same-month observations from the EIA data and the FHA data were, on average, within three percent of each other. 20 Sixty two gasoline markets are the result of some states having multiple formulations over the study period. For example, outside of the Milwaukee area, Wisconsin stations sell conventional gasoline. From January 1, 1995 until December 31, 1995, Milwaukee stations sold federal RFG while from January 1, 1996 on, Milwaukee stations sold ethanol-oxygenated RFG. 21 Specifically, my calculation of light-product production capacity at these refineries is equal to forty percent of atmospheric distillation capacity added to the sum of thermal cracking capacity, catalytic cracking capacity and hydrocracking capacity. Although this is a rough measure of capacity, as crude choice affects production limits, individuals knowledgeable about refining consider this a reasonable approximation of light product capacity. located in the contiguous US with light product production capacity exceeding eight hundred thousand gallons per day. This subset of refiners contains over ninety-five percent of estimated domestic light product capacity. 24 I identify each refinery's ability to serve each of the 78 markets described above using several sources. Maps of refineries and petroleum product pipelines determine pipeline access of each refinery. In addition, since pipelines are unidirectional, I
use these maps to determine the markets each refinery is able to serve by pipeline. Access to barge transportation is determined either by proximity to water or access to pipelines serving water-proximate storage terminals. Transportation costs for each refinery-state combination are then calculated as the least cost method of serving the state from the refinery. For example, a refinery in Texas with access to barges is assumed to serve Nevada markets by barging product from Texas to California and then shipping that product by pipeline from California to Nevada.
While I do not explicitly model pipeline constraints in this paper, omitting pipeline constraints would lead to a conservative estimate of the effect of content regulation on price volatility.
Imports of petroleum products are small relative to domestic production -hence, in the structural model, I take imports to be exogenous. 25 The EIA tracks monthly imports by petroleum district of a variety of finished petroleum products, including gasoline by federal-formulation standard. Conventional gasoline imports are assumed to be the sum of oxygenated imports and other gasoline imports. Jet fuel imports are assumed to be sum of jet fuel and aviation 22 Many smaller refineries produce specialized petroleum products for industrial use and do not actively produce gasoline, jet fuel and distillate. As a result, although these refineries account for approximately five percent of light-product capacity, they account for a smaller proportion of light product production. 23 Although different spot prices are used, crude spot prices in California, Alaska and Wyoming closely correlate with the WTI spot price at Cushing, OK. For each of these incidents, I identify the processing unit or units involved, the duration of the outage, and estimate the effect of the outage on light-product production. Table 1 lists the unexpected outages I identify through news, regulatory and industry sources, along with the outage date, repair date and outage severity.
Structural Model of Supply Shocks
I consider a three step game in which refiners choose quantities of light petroleum products to maximize expected profits subject to changing information about refinery outages. Consistent with pre-production planning, in the first step, refineries commit to quantities of light petroleum products without knowing outages. In the second step, outages are realized and observed by all refineries. In the final step, refineries allocate production across different geographic areas in response to the outage. Thus, a refinery choosing to produce federal RFG, but not CARB gasoline, can redistribute federal RFG from one market to another in response to an outage, but cannot, in the short term, produce CARB gasoline instead.
In the first step, refineries have knowledge of all supply and demand variables with the exception of unexpected outages occurring in the current period. That is, prior to choosing initial production at time t, the inverse residual demand curve, p jt (.), in each geographic-product market j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} and the cost functions for all refineries are common knowledge. For each domestic refinery, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I}, let q ijt be the initial choice of quantity in market j at time t, q it denote the total production capacity of all light petroleum products, c(q i1 , q i2 , . . . , q iJ ) be the refinery production cost function and t ij denote the transportation costs from refinery i to market j.
Refiners choose quantities of each petroleum product to maximize the expectation, with respect to all possible refinery outages ω ∈ Ω, of own-refinery profits plus a portion of other refinery profits, α. 26 The objective function for a refiner owning refineriesĨ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , I} is given by
subject to refinery capacity and non-negativity constraints
for all i ∈Ĩ and all j where Π it is again
In the second step, refinery outages and severity are realized and fully observed by all refineries. If production at a refinery with initial production exceeding post-outage refinery capacity is curtailed by an outage at time t, production is scaled back evenly across all products.
In the third step, refiners allocate production across geographic markets response to the realization of outages ω ∈ Ω. Consistent with limited refinery operational flexibility during a production run, refineries can redistribute production across geographic markets, but cannot adjust the mix of petroleum they produce in step three. Let {J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J n } be a proper partition of markets {1, 2, . . . , J} by product content, where all markets sharing a given set of content regulations belong to one element of {J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J n }. 27 In the third step, a refiner owning a set of refineriesĨ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , I} again chooses quantities {q ijt } for i ∈Ĩ to maximize an objective function consisting of own-refinery profits plus a portion of other refinery profits given by
where Π it is given by 26 See Cyert and DeGroot (1973) . In this formulation, the interpretation of α is the weight an individual refiner places on the profits of refineries it does not own. A value of α = 1 is consistent with joint profit maximization by all refiners while a value of α = 0 implies entirely own-profit maximization. 27 For example, J1 could denote conventional gasoline markets, J2 reformulated gasoline markets, J3 jet fuel markets, and J4 CARB gasoline.
subject to non-negativity constraints and binding product-level capacity constraints
Suppressing the time subscript, initial choice of production of refinery i for market j satisfies the first order condition
where λ i denotes the shadow cost of production capacity at refinery i and µ ij denotes the nonnegativity constraint. In months with outages, the final choice of production of refinery i for market j satisfies
whereλ ij denotes the shadow cost of the production constraint of refinery i to increase production of a petroleum product compatible with product j. Alternatively, expressing the FOC as a lerner-style index, the quantities of all I refineries must jointly satisfy the set of I first order conditions for market j, given by
where ij denotes elasticity of the residual demand curve faced by refinery i in market j at quantity q ij .
I make functional form assumptions for the cost and demand functions, c(q i1 , q i2 , . . . , q iJ ) and p jt (.). I assume refinery production costs are additively separable and that the marginal cost of refinery i to produce a fuel for market j at time t is
where OilP rice it is the delivered oil price at refinery i, Log(DC it ) is the log of atmospheric distillation capacity of refinery i, and CON V j , RF G j , ERF G j ,CARB j , JF j and DIST j are dummy variables corresponding to conventional gasoline, reformulated gasoline, ethanol-blended RFG, CARB gasoline, jet fuel and distillate. 28 The choice of functional form allows for differential production costs by product, economies of scale in refinery distillation capacity and regionspecific crude prices, incorporating both the price of local crude streams and transportation to the refinery.
I introduce a stochastic error term into the inverse demand curve for each market, p jt (.), common to all refiners and realized after refiners choose quantities in each market. Take jt ∼ N (0, σ 2 j ) to be an additive stochastic shock to the inverse demand curve for market j from the previous section,
I assume that jt is independently distributed across geographic areas. Intuitively, this source of error is akin to a common market shock to a population's propensity to drive, unobservable to refiners, such as weather conditions. This specification is equivalent to a first-order taylor approximation of a isoelastic demand curve, q jt (p jt ) = γ e p e jt , taken at the observed price and quantity in market j at time t.
Estimation
Absent the functional form specifications for the cost and demand functions, the model defines a deterministic correspondence, f : (X, θ, ) → Y , between factors influencing refinery supply decisions, such as content regulations, input and transportation costs collectively denoted (X), the vector of unobserved cost, conduct and elasticity parameters (θ), the vector of error terms , and market-level prices and quantities (Y ). 29 That is, f maps a given state space and values for unobservable parameters to all market equilibria that are solutions to the refinery optimization problem. Given the functional form assumptions, the set of FOCs simplifies to a full-rank linear problem. Thus, the functional form assumptions provide a sufficient condition for f to be a function and for a unique solution to the optimization problem.
Linearity of the refiner FOC's allows me to separably express Y jt as a function of the predicted output, f (X t , θ), and the stochastic error jt .
I numerically search for the NLLS set of parameters, that is,
I estimateθ numerically, finding the vector of values for θ minimizing the squared error between f (X, θ) and Y via a steepest ascent search algorithm. 30 As part of my robustness checks, I test the sensitivity of my simulation results to variations in the NLLS parameter point estimates.
In addition, the expectation is taken with respect to the continuous state space of all possible refinery outages. In order to numerically solve for f (X t , θ), I initially assume refiners place a zero prior probability on unexpected refinery outages. Treating the optimization in this way induces refineries to produce less CARB and ethanol-blended RFG than they otherwise would if they assumed an outage at a plant in California or Illinois were likely. As part of my sensitivity analyses, I verify the robustness of my simulations by allowing for refineries to place a positive prior probability on a discrete subspace of the continuum of all possible refinery outages. I find that this assumption does not change my conclusions. Although outages have a large local effect, the probability of an outage is low. 31 When choosing production, refiners weigh the benefits of committing to incremental CARB or ethanol-RFG production in states of the world in which a local outage occurs in California, Illinois or Wisconsin, against the incremental production costs associated with manufacturing CARB or ethanol-RFG as well as the shadow-cost of capacity if the refinery is capacity constrained. As a result, assuming refiners place a zero probability prior on unexpected outages does not change refinery choice of production significantly. When 30 In this case, the steepest ascent search algorithm is computationally efficient relative to a method requiring computation of the second derivatives, such as Gauss-Newton. The seed point for the steepest ascent algorithm, α = .15, β1 = 1, β2 = −1, β3 = 5, β4 = 10, β5 = 13, β6 = 15, β7 = 3, β8 = 1, is based on an initial simulation of PADD 5 only and ex-ante government estimates for production costs of different gasoline blends. 31 Over the study period, news, industry and government sources document only forty-five production-lowering outages. The expected monthly percentage of total refinery capacity down due to an unexpected outage is 0.2 percent.
simulated, the magnitude of the effect is an order of magnitude less than the effect of the content regulations. Table 2 reports the point estimates forθ. The coefficient on log distillation capacity, β 1 , is less than 0, consistent with increasing returns to distillation capacity. The coefficient on crude cost, β 2 is below the ex ante prediction of 1. This suggests that the spot price overstates the price of crude oil processed at refineries, possibly due to long term contracts whose prices vary less than domestic spot prices. Cost parameters corresponding to differential production costs for different product blends are similar to government and industry estimates. The incremental production costs relative to conventional gasoline for federal RFG and CARB gasoline are within EPA and CARB estimates of four to eight cents and five to fifteen cents respectively.
Point Estimates
The competition coefficient and elasticity estimates are similar to expectations as well. The point estimate for α is 0.03 and is not statistically different from 0. This result is consistent with refiners making their production decisions based purely on self-interest and that persistent tacit collusion amongst refiners is not prevalent, consistent with the conclusions of academic and non-academic studies.
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The estimate of short-run gasoline demand elasticity is consistent with both the meta-analysis presented in Espey(1998) 
Model Fit
I use two metrics to assess how well the model predicts actual prices. By product and geographic market, I compare the first and second moments of the simulated and actual prices, to assess whether, in aggregate, the model accurately predicts differences in wholesale prices across products and geographic markets. I then compare the average predicted and actual price change over the previous month in months and states with local refinery outages. 
Simulation Results
Using the point estimates of the cost, conduct and elasticity parameters, I simulate wholesale prices under several counterfactuals to quantify the effects of content regulation, changes in ownership and declining reserve refining capacity.
Effects of Gasoline Content Regulation
I estimate the effect of CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended RFG on regional price levels and the extent to these local content regulations contribute to price spikes caused by refinery outages.
To quantify the effect of these regulations, I simulate counterfactual prices for each of my 78 markets as if the content regulations in California, Illinois and Wisconsin simply met federal RFG standards. Table 6 .
Conditioning on outage allows separation of the persistent effects of regulatory differentiation, such as increased production costs or changes to local competition, from the dynamic effect of the constraints placed on refiners responding to supply shocks by s regulatory differentiation.
The average price differential (column 3, Table 6 ) between the base case and counterfactual in months without local outages identifies the persistent effects of regulatory differentiation. The incremental difference in months with local outages identifies the additional dynamic effects of incompatible gasoline regulations. 37 This effect, incremental to the persistent effects of 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents per gallon, captures the constraints local content regulations place 35 I hold all outages, changes in ownership, capacity additions, and input costs constant. The only difference between the base case and initial counterfactual is the gasoline formulation used in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. 36 For outages exceeding a month in duration, I only consider the first month of the outage. Refiners adjust production mix after the first month to account for the outage. To distinguish between these two explanations, I estimate the magnitude of refinery outages in the three states, which provide an upper bound on the reallocation benefits arising from compatibility. If the latter explanation is valid, the refinery outages during the study period in Illinois and Wisconsin should have a proportionately larger effect on prices than refinery outages in California. I quantify the magnitude of the refinery outages by simulating prices in a counterfactual in which local content regulations exist but no refinery outages occur. I compare the average prices predicted in the counterfactual to those predicted in the base case. Table   5 provides the average difference between the predicted prices in the counterfactual and base case conditional and unconditional on outage, an estimate of the magnitude of refinery outages.
The point estimates for the average magnitude of local refinery outages are 6.7, 7.3 and 7.7 cents per gallon for California, Chicago and Milwaukee respectively, although they cannot be distinguished statistically.
The estimates in Table 5 and Milwaukee ethanol-blended RFG is due to regulatory differentiation. In constrast, both regulatory and geographic differentiation contribute to price spikes in California.
Additional Counterfactuals
In addition to simulating the effect of incompatible content regulations, I also simulate two other counterfactuals. First, I estimate the effect of changes in refinery ownership over the 1995-2001 period on wholesale gasoline prices. Second, I simulate a counterfactual in which I increase the production capacity of all refineries, to estimate the effect of declining reserve refining capacity.
Changes in Refinery Concentration
I simulate prices, holding refinery ownership from January 1995 constant throughout the period.
That is, I simulate prices as if no changes in refinery ownership occurred. All refinery retirements or capacity additions are kept identical to those actually observed. I first calculate the average simulated prices under the counterfactual by PADD region (Table 4a ) and product formulation (Table 4b) I also estimate the effect of refinery ownership on gasoline price spikes caused by local refinery outages. In Table 7 , I present the average price differential between the counterfactual and base case for CARB gasoline, Illinois RFG and Wisconsin RFG contingent and uncontingent on refinery outages. Conditioning on outage has little effect on the results for CARB gasoline.
While the point difference between the predicted prices with and without changes in refinery ownership is larger conditional on an outage, it is still imprecisely estimated and not statistically different than zero. For Illinois and Wisconsin, though, changes in refinery ownership do lead to a signficant 4 to 4.5 cpg increase in prices conditional on a outage than conditional on the absence of outages. This result suggests that changes in refinery ownership may affect the set of refineries in Illinois and Wisconsin which produce ethanol-blended RFG.
Declining Reserve Refining Capacity
I also simulate a counterfactual testing the effect of declining reserve refining capacity. That is, I estimate the price effect of capacity constraints on many of the largest domestic refineries.
I specify three counterfactuals, increasing light product production capacity of all domestic refineries by 2.5%, 5% and 7.5%. 38 Allowing capacity to increase has two effects -it relaxes the binding capacity constraint at the most efficient refineries and relaxes the binding capacity constraint in gasoline-importing regions. Increasing refining capacity should reduce prices in all areas as production is shifted to more efficient refineries but should also reduce prices relatively more in gasoline-importing regions. As above, Tables 4a and 4b present the descriptive statistics for the simulated counterfactual prices by geographic and product market and Table 8 presents the simulated price differential between the counterfactual and the base case, conditional and unconditional on refinery outages.
The results in Tables 4a and 4b are consistent with ex ante predictions. Increasing refinery capacity by five percent lowers prices in all geographic markets between 3.9 and 4.5 cents per gallon. In addition, the districts experiencing the largest price reductions are the Rocky Mountain states (PADD 4 -4.5 cpg) and New England (PADD 1a -4.3 cpg). Capacity-constrained geographic regions benefit from both reallocation of production to the most efficient refineries and the relaxation of the binding capacity constraint on local refineries. Areas with excess refining capacity only benefit from the former.
Increasing production capacity of all refineries by five percent does not effect substantively which refineries produce CARB or ethanol-blended RFG gasoline. Thus, the average price differentials reported in Table 8 contingent on a local outage and contingent on no outages are statistically indistinguishable.
Sensitivity Analyses
To test the robustness of the estimates in Section 8.1, I test the sensitivity of the simulated prices to the assumption that refiners place a zero probability prior on refinery outages and to changes in the estimated cost, conduct and elasticity parameters.
Forward-Looking Refinery Optimization
To test sensitivity of the results to the assumption that refiners place a zero prior probability on unexpected outages, I simulate a counterfactual in which each risk-neutral refiner places a common, positive prior on outages at each refinery. 39 For computational tractability, firms only consider the effects of single, refinery-wide outages. Firms choose production in step 1 to maximize expected profits and then are allowed to reallocate production after observing the realized set of outages. Table 9a and 9b compare predicted prices when refiners incorporate a positive probability of outage to the predictions from the initial model. The mean predicted prices for ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline are 0.45 cpg and 0.34 cpg lower when refinery optimization decisions incorporate outages than when they do not. Mean predicted prices for conventional gasoline, 39 I set the probability to be 0.0021, consistent with actual observed outages during the study period.
RFG, jet fuel and distillate are between 0.11 cpg lower to 0.07 cpg higher. This is consistent with ex ante expectations -outages have the greatest effect on CARB and ethanol-blended RFG prices. If refiners incorporate the probability of outages into their initial choice of production, refiners will increase production of CARB and ethanol-blended RFG relative to other products.
When compared to the effect of regulatory differentiation on prices, the effect of the modelling assumption is an order of magnitude less. While each refiner's priors of a refinery-wide outage somewhere in the system in a given month is approximately twenty-five percent, each refiner's priors of an outage at a specific refinery is much lower. Since the prior probability of a local refinery outage in Illinois, Wisconsin or California is relatively low, refiners rarely benefit from increasing production of CARB or ethanol-blended RFG above the level of production modelled in the base case. 40 Furthermore, capacity constraints prevent many refiners from increasing production of CARB or ethanol-blended RFG without decreasing production of another product.
In choosing to produce more CARB or ethanol-blended RFG, capacity-constrained refineries weigh the benefits of incremental production in the event of a relevant local refinery outage against the incremental production cost of the special gasoline blend and the shadow cost of additional refining capacity.
Estimated Structural Parameters
In addition to testing the sensitivity of the simulation results to the assumption of profit maximization, I also test the sensitivity of the results to variation in the structural parameter estimates. I focus on the six unobserved parameters which have the largest effect on simulated CARB and ethanol-blended RFG prices: demand elasticity ( ), the competition coefficient (α), the coefficient on crude oil price (β 2 ), RFG production costs (β 3 ), ethanol-blended RFG production costs (β 4 ) and CARB production costs (β 5 ). 41 In each of the sensitivity tests, I bound the coefficients at two standard deviations above and below the NLLS point estimates reported in Table 2 .
The first sensitivity analyses test the robustness of the estimates to changes in the demand Although the price effects of CARB and ethanol-blended RFG vary across sensitivity tests, the conclusion that compatibility with federal RFG has the potential to mitigate a significant proportion of the effect of local refinery outages, especially in Illinois and Wisconsin is robust.
Conclusion
In this paper, I use a structural model of refinery production to study how regional gasoline 
